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The history of analytic philosophy is a troubled genre. Ana-
lytic philosophers have only recently shown an interest in their 
historical roots, and to date no one has succeeded in providing a 
historical account of the period (roughly) 1879-1960 which is both 
relatively complete and free from excessive bias. We have fine, 
historically sensitive studies of practically every major early fig-
ure (e.g. Kenny on Frege', Baldwin on Moore2, Hylton on Russell3, 
Coffa4 and more recently Friedmann5 on the positivists, and too 
many to mention on Wittgenstein, both early and late); but these 
do not provide, and don't purport to provide, systematic accounts 
of the historical interconnections and influences in question. We 
also have a couple of ostensible histories proper; but these are ei-
ther too idiosyncratic (Dummett6, Hacker7) or too incomplete 
(Gross8, Passmore9) to fit the bill. 
Avrum Stroll has written a history of analytic philosophy which 
suffers from neither defect. He discusses, usually in some detail, 
the work of Frege, Moore, Russell, Schlick, Carnap, Austin, Ryle, 
Quine, Kripke, Marcus and both Wittgensteins. He also attempts 
to unearth influences and interrelations amongst these thinkers. It 
cannot be said, moreover, that his book suffers from any particular 
bias or radical perspective. In nearly every case he attempts (ad-
mirably) to meet the philosopher in question on the latter's own 
terms. Despite this, however, the book cannot be judged a suc-
cess. In the course of this review I will indicate why this is so, 
beginning with more general reasons and proceeding to discussion 
of Stroll's section on Quine, to my mind the worst of the book's 
nine chapters. 
The main problem with the book is that it fails to illuminate. 
Certainly some of the discussions (e.g. of Austin and the later 
Wittgenstein) are competent and interesting; but for the most part 
the reader receives little more than some biographical data and 
stock summary of position.1 0 Stroll is not without talent as an ex-
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positor, and much of the biographical information is very enjoy-
able to read. However, in those cases in which he does attempt to 
go beyond this quite basic exercise, he fails. I'll give two ex-
amples (but see further below on Quine). First, in a chapter en-
titled "Logical Positivism and the Tractatus" Stroll wonders why 
given the mystical nature of the remarks near the end of the early 
Wittgenstein's opus and the apparent incompatibility between these 
and the metaphysics of logical atomism, Wittgenstein didn't just 
start over and write a new book (63)". This is an odd question. It 
might make some sense if Stroll were to demonstrate, and not as-
sume, that there is a conflict between Wittgenstein's metaphysics 
and his mysticism. Second, Stroll notes the sad fact that Austin 
died at the height of his powers, in his late forties. He goes on to 
speculate about how philosophy might have been different had 
Austin lived for another twenty or thirty years. "My own guess is 
that its consequences would have been momentous and that the 
course of mainstream philosophy would have been radically dif-
ferent"(166). This conjecture belies a failure to understand the 
limited scope of Austin's influence. 
Stroll recognizes Quine's status as the most influential living 
philosopher, and accordingly devotes an entire chapter to his work. 
The discussion centers on Quine's rejection of the analytic/syn-
thetic distinction, his behaviorism, and his epistemological natu-
ralism. So far so good. But already in the opening biographical 
remarks we've got problems. Stroll notes, correctly, that Quine's 
500-page autobiography amounts in general to little more than a 
travel diary. He says truly that Quine's work seems to him the 
most important thing in his life. He then draws conclusions which 
are nothing short of absurd. "Because his inward life is everything, 
his outward life is as solitary as a monk's"; " . . . in a way Quine is 
a sol ipsist . . . a practical solipsist who isolates himself from [the 
world]"; "Der Mann ist seiner Arbeif\\%6). On the following 
page Stroll notes an even "greater mystery. Why would a solipsist 
write not one but two autobiographies?" This entire discussion is 
silly and a complete waste of time. 
Stroll distinguishes in Quine's work what he calls 'three suc-
cessive phases', but then notes that the stages don't follow tempo-
rally upon one another (the first, 'logic' phase, is said to begin in 
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1934 and end in 1970; the third, 'epistemological' stage "com-
mences in 1951"!) One wonders what 'successive' and 'phase' 
mean in Stroll's idiolect. 
We come finally to the substantive criticism of Quine. I will 
focus on four of Stroll's charges. First, he claims that Quine thinks 
there are no numbers (181, 188). This is easy to refute; it is just 
false. For at least the last forty years, and in publications Stroll 
himself mentions and quotes from, Quine has been an unrepentant 
platonist about mathematical entities. Second, he notes that Quine 
adheres to scientism. "So the question for him is whether scien-
tific theory requires the existence of various kinds of abstract enti-
ties. His naturalism tells him that it does not"(201, his emphasis). 
As should be obvious to any reader of Quine, his concern is not 
with abstractness as such; it is with criteria of identity. Sets are 
abstract, and their identity criterion is as clear as could be. 'Two' 
sets are identical if they have the same members. Propositions, 
attributes, and other intensional rodents are abstract as well, but 
lack clear criteria of identity. Quine keeps sets and dispenses with 
the rest. Third, Stroll thinks he has a devastating objection to 
Quine's indeterminacy semantics. "Quine thinks that we can iden-
tify what an utterance means with an auditor's reaction to it. But 
this thesis is susceptible to a serious objection. For an auditor to 
respond to an utterance, he must already understand what it 
means"(205). Quine does not think, nor has he ever said, that we 
can identify utterance meaning with audience reaction. Stroll is 
confusing, among other things, the intuitive notion of meaning, 
which Quine thinks is more-or-less useless, with the proposed no-
tion of stimulus-meaning, which is not meant to replace the intui-
tive notion in every context. The final charge from Stroll I'll con-
sider here is that he thinks he sees an inconsistency within Quine's 
treatment of the analytic-synthetic distinction (206-207). The criti-
cism is familiar from Boghossian and Putnam (so at least here 
Stroll is in good company). At times it seems as if Quine is saying 
that there are no analytic sentences; at other times he appears to 
claim merely that the a/s distinction is not clear. Stroll and 
Boghossian think the two claims are in conflict, and it isn't diffi-
cult to see why - if the predicate 'is analytic' is unclear, then how 
could we know what, if anything, is in its extension? 
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The fallacy is in thinking that Quine's two claims, and I admit 
that he does say or imply both, are made on the same method-
ological level. A more perspicuous way of making his point would 
be to note first that the analytic/synthetic distinction is fatally un-
clear (it is crucial to note that clarity, at least for Quine, is a matter 
of degree); we can make no sense of it save by assuming the no-
tions of meaning, synonymy or necessity, and the members of this 
ill-begotten triad are not one jot clearer than is analyticity. And 
second, it is to be pointed out that, in any case, there are no ana-
lytic sentences. Quine's commitments to extensionalism and to 
pragmatism sometimes come into conflict; e.g., propositional atti-
tude contexts are woefully unclear, but we cannot practically get 
on without them. If the notion of analyticity (or necessity or syn-
onymy) were likewise to be shown indispensable, Quine would 
tolerate its relative unclarity. However, we can do quite well with-
out analyticity; indeed as Duhem showed recalcitrant data can be 
accommodated in sundry ways, and Quine takes this to demon-
strate that sentences don't possess significance individually and 
that any can be revised. 
Now this argument assumes that any adequate notion of ana-
lyticity will entail incorrigibility; if you want a notion of analytic-
ity according to which we might revise an analytic statement (such 
as Boghossian's epistemic conception), you're well advised to drop 
the word 'analytic' and take up instead 'a priori'. The latter can do 
the work needed without misleading the reader. 
In summary, while Stroll makes an honest effort at a 
hard and demanding task, his book in the end just isn't compe-
tent. The history of analytic philosophy has yet to be written. 
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was written. 
9. One Hundred Years of Philosophy (Duckworth, 1957); Recent 
Philosophers (Open Court, 1985). The combination of Passmore's two 
books (the latter beginning as an appendage to the former) comes closest 
to success here. The problem is that the first book doesn't restrict itself to 
analytic philosophy as such, and the second is too brief. (I don't of course 
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10. There are within the book a couple of original contributions to 
the issues, but these are naive and poorly thought-out. Here is one char-
acteristic moment: in the course of discussing the direct reference theo-
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to H20 because ice is water and ice is not so identical. 
11. All intratextual page references are to the book under review. 
